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Abstract, Keywords, JEL Codes
Ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are, therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which
can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon them. . . . The annual produce of the land
and labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the people, might be the
same after such a tax as before. . . . [A tax of this kind would be] much more proper to be
established as a perpetual and unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of
the commonwealth, than any tax which was always to be levied according to a certain valuation.
─Adam Smith ([1776], 844, 834)
In my opinion, the least bad tax is the property tax on the unimproved value of land, the Henry
George argument of many, many years ago.
─Milton Friedman (1978, 14)

MOST OF THE LITERATURE ON TAXATION, IN TEXTBOOKS AND
articles, is confined to studying existing forms of taxes, namely income,
payroll, sales, excise, tariff, value-added, estate and property taxes.
Consider the article by David Altig et al in the American Economic
Review (2001) entitled "Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United
States." The authors examine "fundamental alternatives" to the U.S. federal
income tax. "Fundamental", they explain, means "the simplification and
integration of the tax code by eliminating tax preferences and taxing all
sources of capital income at the same rate" (574). It is important to analyze
*
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such reforms, but the reforms simulated are not what I would call
fundamental. They are only a restructuring of the existing income-tax code.
Here, I plead for more attention to truly fundamental reform. The
idea is to tax the market value of land, exclusive of the value of
improvements.
Some people might think that the ideas explored here are just a "pet
topic" or "hobby horse," but I proclaim otherwise. These ideas are directly
and importantly relevant to many aspects of public economics. The
principles are empirically pervasive and compelling; they are testable and
abundantly demonstrated in historical and cross-sectional studies. Finally,
these lines of thinking carry certain lessons and policy implications that can
be pursued incrementally and approached by practical politics and gradual
reform. There is nothing impractical or "utopian" about the points I wish to
see integrated into public economics. Whether they will ever be politically
possible is a separate question, the answer to which is a function of our
intellectual enterprise.
The large middle part of this article treats a series of mainstream
topics. I develop that series of topics to show that mainstream literature has
a way of dancing around the idea of taxing land value. But first the basic
ideas call for clarification.

LAND AND ITS UNIQUENESS
“Land” includes all earthly space, not just solid surfaces. Land
includes water areas and the electro-magnetic spectrum, but the most
important potential source of public revenue from land is real estate sites.
The characteristics of land are well known. Land has a fixed supply.
The space within some boundary can be neither expanded nor contracted.
Land is fixed not only in extent but also in mobility, unlike people, who can
migrate, or capital goods, which are more or less mobile. Land cannot be
imported. Even in the case of buildings and other permanent structures,
they differ from land in that they are created by human enterprise, and in
that their creators decide where the structure will be located. Finally, land is
not something to be discovered. Once people figured out that the earth was
a sphere, and its approximate size, they knew that the land was “out there.”
Entrepreneurship is vital in discovering the best routes to land areas, it is
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vital in discovering the potential value of those areas, but it is not vital in
discovering that the land is out there. That was known all along.

GEO-RENT
The term “rent” is most generally defined as a payment for the use of
any resource (Alchian 1991). “Land rent” could refer either to the actual
amount paid by tenants or to the potential or economic rent. My analysis
here is based on an assessment or estimate of what the plot-devoid-ofimprovements would rent for in a market or auction. This has been called
"ground rent" or “economic land rent,” but those names and others are
easily misunderstood. To ensure against the hazard of reasonable but
erroneous inference, I propose an exotic label, geo-rent. “Geo” in Latin
means earth or ground, and it also suggests George, as in Henry George.
A site’s geo-rent is not based on the particular activity at that site.
The geo-rent of a site containing lavish buildings and gardens equals what
the geo-rent would be if, for some strange reason, those improvements
suddenly disintegrated. A fully developed site has about the same geo-rent
(per acre) as an adjacent vacant lot.
Suppose I own a 50-acre site that is pristine, unimproved. That site
would rent for $100,000. Hence, the geo-rent is $100,000. The next year I
build a large beautiful and successful shopping center on the site. My georent is still only $100,000 (assuming the amount for which my site
unimproved would rent has not changed). However, if my shopping center
makes neighboring land more valuable, it does increase my neighbor’s georent.
The interrelation between one landowner’s improvements and his
neighbor’s geo-rent is an interesting matter. Another interesting matter is a
landowner’s contribution to improvements on neighboring lands, such as
sponsoring a new road. If the new road would increase his geo-rent tax bill,
geo-rent taxation, it would seem, would reduce his incentive to sponsor
such an improvement.1 But here I leave these tangents aside, with the
summary judgment that I do not think that such issues do much, if
anything, to weaken the case for tapping geo-rent.
The effect on geo-rent would be smaller if the road is a toll-road, because then more of the
value added is internalized, i.e., capture by the road owners.

1
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ASSESSING GEO-RENT IS EASY COMPARED TO ASSESSING
SALES, INCOME, OR PROFITS
I concede that geo-rent is a hypothetical. Geo-rent is based on two
fictions. The first is that the site is devoid of improvements. The second is
that it is being rented out. One occasionally hears criticisms of geo-rent
taxation like this from the textbook by McConnell and Brue (2005, 300):
“[I]n practice it would be difficult to determine how much of any specific
income payment actually amounted to [geo-rent].”
Yet, professional real estate appraisers routinely separate a site’s
ground value and the improvement’s value. This separation is typically
required for fire insurance. Banks for mortgages also commonly require it.
These parties estimate site value as a residual after the replacement cost of
buildings, adjusted for depreciation. This process is combined with
computerized contour mapping of site value per square meter, based on
actual land-sale and lease data. The computerized mapping works to
smooth out the assessments, and can be done to emphasize long-term
trends rather than year-by-year fluctuations in land values (as is done today
with the assessment of property-tax). Adam Smith (1776) advocates georent taxation (832-844) and explains that separating out the value of
improvements is not that big a deal (833, 844).2
Of course this is inexact. Of course there will be judgment calls by
assessors, as well as some politicking in the details. But serious economics is
comparative. All tax rules will involve inexactness, judgment calls, and
politicking. Let’s ask honestly how serious these problems are compared to
other forms of taxation.
Sales, incomes, profits, imports, and estates are easily hidden.
Deductions, cost accounting, and expenses are devilishly particularistic,
involving whatever human activities the taxed party says are involved in
generating sales, income, or profits. Documentation is a tangle of complex
record keeping, and is very difficult to make accountable. Documentation is
easily fabricated. Enforcement is intrusive and encroaches on civil liberties.
The dimensions of earning sales, income, etc. are myriad, and all call for
particularistic tax rules, each highly subject to arbitrariness and politicking
because of the particularism.

George carefully rationalized the single tax in terms of Adam Smith's "canons of taxation."
On the affinity between Smith and George, see Petrella (1984).

2
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By contrast, it is impossible to hide land. It is impossible to shrink,
move or disguise land. Moreover, the dimensions of valuing ground space
are relatively few. The government can set general rules that apply
universally. In contrast to income-tax records which are for good reasons
kept from public view, the site-value assessments for geo-rent would be a
public record, as in fact real-estate assessments are today. In principle,
absolutely no record keeping is required, apart from title to the land.
Compared to taxing income, sales, estates, etc., taxing geo-rent is objective,
transparent, and non-intrusive. These virtues were emphasized by Adam
Smith (1776, 848).
Those who allege a relative difficulty in separating the value of land
from the value of improvements lose sight of the main policy issue. The
relative efficiency of tapping geo-rent is that doing so imposes no marginal
cost on additional income, sales, or personal property. Condominiums
assign to each unit a fixed percentage interest in the association, which is
also its percentage of the assessments. This percentage interest is often
based on the site value of the unit relative to the other units, i.e. its location
and size, irrespective of any personal property inside the unit, let alone the
owners’ income or spending.
Thousands of condominium associations are thus accomplishing
what some claim is impractical. They tap the site value of a unit without
reducing extra income or burdening extra spending or possessions.
Residential associations, hotels, and other private communities do likewise
with their rental charges and assessments. Some private communities such
as shopping centers do practice modern sharecropping, basing some of
their charges on the gross revenue of the tenant shops as a way of sharing
risks, but this is not an essential feature of private-community financing.

GRADUAL REFORM: 20 YEARS TO 75 PERCENT
A shift to public finance from geo-rent would be politically difficult,
which may help explain why it has not been done. The political difficulty,
however, exists despite the fact that most homeowners, being also wage
earners, would have a net gain if other taxes, including the property tax on
improvements, were simultaneously abolished. But some current
landowners, especially of urban commercial real estate, would have a net
loss, unless we build in some kind of “compensation.” Economists are
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accustomed to saying that a tough transition—plant-closings, declining
industries, retooling and retraining—should not deter the long-term good.
The same should apply here.
I suggest the following transition to geo-rent taxation, if only to serve
as a conceptual model:
Time 0:

The new regime is enacted into law.

Years 1 through 10: The landowner continues to pay the roughly 25
percent of the geo-rent now implicit in his current property taxes. (If the
property tax is 2 percent of land value and the capitalization rate (real
interest rate) is 6 percent, that works out to about 25 percent of geo-rent,
which is an annualized dimension.)
Year 11:
Year 12:
Year 13:
Year 14:
Year 15:
Year 16:
Year 17:
Year 18:
Year 19:
Year 20:
Thereafter:

He pays 30 percent.
He pays 35 percent.
He pays 40 percent.
He pays 45 percent.
He pays 50 percent.
He pays 55 percent.
He pays 60 percent.
He pays 65 percent.
He pays 70 percent.
He pays 75 percent.
He pays 75 percent.

Here are a number of points that help to flesh out the scheme:
• The scheme applies also to government-owned land. The
associated government agency, such as the Bureau of Land
Management or the United States Postal Service, would pay geo-rent
for the land it owns. This will improve government cost accounting
and policy decisions.
• To which level of government are geo-rent taxes paid? This is an
important question, but I wish to sidestep it here. For present
purposes, one may imagine a system in which, like property taxes
today, geo-rent taxes would be collected at the level of county
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government. When such taxes are sufficiently large, they would flow
both down to the city governments and up to the state and national
governments.
• The other side of the scheme, not detailed here, is the untaxing of
buildings, sales, income, etc. Thus, the scheme involves an enormous
confiscation of land-wealth and an enormous de-confiscation of other
kinds of wealth.
A reform like that suggested here would, of course, require a
movement and public debate taking years, if not decades. Once enacted,
during the first 10 years, the landowners pay no more in geo-rent than they
are accustomed to paying. All this lead-up time will give people time to
figure out what geo-rent taxation means, and to work out in markets the
present values of land, in anticipation of the coming increases in levies.

NO EXCESS BURDEN
The writings of the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James
Mill, John Stuart Mill, Henry George, Leon Walras, and Knut Wicksell,
among many other economists, well recognize that the taxation of site
values, as an inelastic factor, has no excess burden, no deadweight loss.
Geo-rent merely gets transferred to government. The burden is borne by
the owner in not keeping that portion of the geo-rent. The tax is not passed
on to tenants, since a higher rental charge reduces the quantity of rental
space demanded, while not reducing the fixed space supplied, and thus
creates vacancies which induce landlords to keep the rent at the previous
level to avoid losses. There is no excess burden on the economy other than
the ordinary costs of tax administration (which, as noted, would be
particularly low for this type of tax).
The financial burden is only on the owners who are current at the
time the geo-rent tax is increased. What is not so well recognized in public
finance is that, after the transition to geo-rent taxation, there is no burden
on any new site owner. The price of land is capitalized down in proportion
to the tax rate, so the payment of the tax is offset by the lower price of land.
However, if we may neglect the consequences on the dependents and heirs

ECON JOURNAL WATCH

112

GEO-RENT

of the current landowners, after the transitional generation, no one suffers a
burden.
The impact on the current landowners raises issues of
“compensation.” While advocates of tapping geo-rent for public revenue
argue that it is equitable, because it pays back geo-rent generated by
government’s civic works, critics argue that the transition would not be
equitable, because the financial burden would be concentrated on
landowners. Robert Solow (1998, 278) states that while taxing geo-rent
would be good for a new country, “Expropriating land values today would
have no semblance of fairness.” He adds, however, that if the transition is
gradual or if there is compensation, then “the complaint of iniquity may
lose validity.”
An immediate tax shift to geo-rent, with other taxes reduced or
abolished, could be compensated with special bonds whose face-value
interest payments would decrease over time, with an effect similar to the
gradual increase in the geo-rent tax rate suggested above. But compensation
is a side issue. I say we try to sell the reform to the current landowners on
its merits, just as we would argue for a reduction in trade barriers, as a
worthy sacrifice, and offer our gratitude for their political cooperation. (I
say this as the owner of a prime plot in Berkeley, California!)

MAINSTREAM LITERATURE: READ BETWEEN THE LINES
Mainstream microeconomic and public finance textbooks almost
never bring the idea of geo-rent taxation into the sunlight. The respected
journals, too, give very little attention to these ideas. The principles behind
the idea of geo-rent taxation make sense, however. Indeed, those very same
textbooks and journal articles establish many of the principles that sustain
the idea. But the principles are scattered throughout the literature. The
literature is compartmentalized in such a fashion that prevents students
from seeing how the principles form a powerful idea. In this sense, geo-rent
lurks between the lines of the public-economics literature.
Here I highlight eight mainstream topics where geo-rent principles
surface: (a) “producer surplus,” (b) deadweight loss analysis, (c) the Henry
George Theorem, (d) capitalization, (e) public goods, (f) externalities, (g)
club-good models, and (h) the Tiebout model.
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Producer Surplus
Every microeconomics textbook shows the “producer surplus” as the
area between the supply curve and the price. But no textbook that I have
seen, with the exception of David Friedman (1996), has thought to ask who
receives the surplus. If the industry is perfectly competitive, firms being
price takers, there is no economic profit, yet the surplus is a return beyond
costs. The surplus does not go to the owners of the firms, but, as Friedman
states, flows through to the input factor owners. Going beyond Friedman, it
should be clear that if markets for labor and capital goods, too, are perfectly
competitive, they too have no super-normal returns, so the only other place
the surplus can go to is to geo-rent. In a fully perfectly competitive model,
“producer surplus” does not go to producers at all; it is a payment to
landowners who have never produced a thing. It is really the non-producer
surplus.
Deadweight Loss Analysis
Microeconomics textbooks explain the deadweight loss from
taxation. They explain how the loss is lower with a more inelastic supply
and demand. Professors have given thousands of classroom lectures
showing that if the supply curve were perfectly vertical, there would be no
deadweight loss. But they usually end the discussion by saying, “and so it is
good to try to put such taxation on goods that exhibit relative inelasticity in
supply or demand.” Some textbooks go on to say that, because the supply
of land is fixed, the taxation of land rent has no excess burden. A few
books point out that Henry George proposed such taxation. None that I
have seen point out that Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill did, too.
Tideman et al (2002, 17) “estimate that the net gain (measured in real
dollars of 2000), from shifting as much taxation to land as could be
financed by collecting 90% of the land rent, would be $1308 billion or 14%
of NDP in 2002 and $4,799 billion or 26.6% of NDP in 2042.” Even if
only a fraction of government revenue shifted from the types of taxes we
know today to a geo-rent tax, the efficiency gains could be really substantial.
The elasticity insight remains compartmentalized. In public finance
textbooks, when the discussion turns to tax policies, the insight is rather
neglected, and the idea of taxing land value is usually nowhere to be found.
It is as though there were some medicine available that we know cures
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cancer, yet nobody takes it and no doctor prescribes it. Economists who
study irrational behavior should take note.
The Henry George Theorem
Textbooks in public finance and urban economics sometimes contain
a topic known as the “Henry George Theorem.” It states that the public
revenue that provides for the collective goods of an optimally-sized
community equals the land rent of that community. As presented in
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1987, 523-5), the representative agent’s utility
function is U(G,X), where G is a collective and X a private good. Output Y
is a function of N workers:
Y = f(N) = XN + G.
X = {f(N)-G} / N
The wage is the marginal product of labor:
∂f/∂N = X
Therefore,
∂f/∂N = {(f(N)-G)/N}
G = f(N) - Nf’(N)
With land and labor the ultimate and original factors of production,
rent (R) is the difference between total product Y and total wages:
R = f(N) - Nf'(N)
Therefore,
R = G.
The Henry George Theorem is so named because it echoes Henry
George's (1879) single-tax proposal, that not only should land rent be the
only general tax, but that it will be adequate to finance public goods. The
theorem is accepted in public finance, but it is not applied. In upper-level
public-economics textbooks such as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1987), it is
presented, yet not invoked in policy discussions, and it is ignored in
scholarly treatments of optimal taxation, tax reform, and public policy.
Edwin Mills (1998) goes further and constructs a comparative static
model of a metropolis using a Cobb-Douglas production function with
three factors, the third being land, which is a refreshing change from the
usual two-factor analysis that tucks land into capital and then forgets that
it’s there. One theorem of the model is that a land-value tax has no effect
on resource allocation. Yet he concludes (47) that despite is theoretical
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attractiveness a significant taxing of geo-rent would deprive the owners of
their beneficial uses, and would require compensation, leaving the tax
“practically almost worthless” (47, 41).
Thomas Nechyba (1998) also has a model with land, calibrated to
U.S. parameters. He shows that replacing taxes on capital with taxes on land
can actually increase land values, despite the downward capitalization
caused by the tax, because of the greater increase in capital and rent.
According to the model (196), with an elasticity of substitution between
capital and land of 0.5, which is within the estimated range, a revenueneutral tax shift to land value increases capital goods by 122 percent and
raises output by 89 percent.
Capitalization
The textbooks and mainstream journals recognize the idea of
capitalization. Indeed, there is a great deal of literature about land prices
reflecting the schools, infrastructure, and security in the neighborhood.
But, again, the understanding is often compartmentalized; the insight is
rarely applied in thinking about efficient forms of taxation and governance.
Public economists rarely point out how the idea of capitalization favors
geo-rent taxation: If local government taxes geo-rent, and it uses that
money to provide infrastructure and security, it further enhances geo-rent,
thus recouping some of its investment. If local government claims 50
percent of geo-rent, it has an incentive to enhance geo-rent. It is the half
residual claimant. The arrangement is healthy, because government’s local
works directly affect the magnitude of geo-rent. The government’s residual
claimancy gives it an incentive to produce social benefits.
This government-as-improver process parallels capitalization as the
basis for the private provision of collective goods, such as the common
elements of condominiums financed by the periodic assessment of the
owners. Private communities and condominiums demonstrate the
connection between residual claimancy and capitalization.
Land values in many parts of the United States are very high, and one
reason is supply-side restrictions. But much of the value reflects the
capitalization of amenities. Today, government works are financed in large
part by taxes on labor, profits, sales, and non-land real estate. The owners
of land receive an implicit subsidy. This implicit subsidy is of great empirical
importance, yet is not discussed in microeconomics textbooks, and is
usually ignored in the tax analysis in public finance.

ECON JOURNAL WATCH

116

GEO-RENT

Public Goods
Public goods are usually defined as both nonrival and nonexcludable.
The public finance literature often alleges “market failure” for goods such
as streets, sewers, parks, security, and fire fighting. Once a collective good is
provided, it is not practical or desirable to exclude persons. For example,
even if one agrees that people can be excluded from a city park, it would
not be desirable to have walls and gates to keep out the free riders.
The “free rider” doctrine, however, tends to treat public goods as
though they have no location in space and time. Somewhere, out in the
ether, there is a public good and some users who cannot be made to pay for
benefits. But the benefits of most real-world public goods fall within an
ambit that is territorial. Accordingly, those benefits become capitalized into
the market price of land within that ambit. Those using the civic services
are included by proximity; it is costly for far-away users to visit a
neighborhood park. Residents, businesses, and customers willingly pay
more because they benefit from the territorial goods. Most users therefore
do make payments that are proportional to such amenities, since they must
pay to use land. But the payments are made to the landowner. The marketfailure doctrine for public goods is turned on its head: Users do tend to pay
in an indirect sense, and government policy creates the free riding of the
landowners, at the expense of the extraneous taxpayers. Rather than
correcting any deficiency of markets, policy is iatrogenic, that is, illness caused
by the doctor. Streets, parks, and security suffer from free riding because
the doctor made it that way. This insight is rarely found in mainstream
sources.
Externalities
A similar sort of blinkered compartmentalization goes for textbook
discussions of externalities. The mainstream literature rarely highlights the
point that, whether by geo-rent taxation or by private contract, the tapping
of geo-rent promotes internalization of externalities. If the government
depends on geo-rent, it has a strong incentive to increase geo-rents, or to
ameliorate externalities. Public revenue from site values thus is an important
way to internalize territorial costs and benefits. The failure to tap geo-rent
exacerbates externalities. Private communities do base their finances on site
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rentals, and we are less inclined to identify the positives and negatives
within a private community as “externalities.” Territorial amenities have
been internalized within property relations and pecuniary effects.
Club Models
Although there was previous analysis of excludable collective goods,
including the model of Tiebout (1956) discussed below, James Buchanan
(1965) established club theory by adapting the Samuelson public-goods
model to goods that are excludable and subject to congestion. The model
determines the optimal size of a club in which the members obtain utility
from the club good, disutility from crowding, and no utility from
camaraderie. In the Buchanan model, the cost of the good is divided equally
among the members.
The Buchanan model is suitable to something like a swim club. The
Buchanan model is non-territorial; it does not address location and georent. Some literature does examine territorial clubs, but many of the models
and presentations of club theory intended to be general have ignored land,
even when they seek to be applied to civic goods, making them not only
incomplete but also inapplicable to real-world municipalities.
In their textbook The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club
Goods , Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1986) presented a general theory
of public goods and club goods with no mention of territory or location.
The book's index has no entries for land, rent, capitalization, territory, or
location. Only on the last page of the book (275), they wrote, “Another
suggested research direction concerns the inclusion of a spatial dimension
to club analysis.” They added, “More work on spatial clubs appears
warranted, since no general analysis of spatial clubs exist” (italics in the
original). By 1986, the public-goods literature already had the Henry George
Theorem (Stiglitz 1977, Vickrey 1977), as well as a substantial body of
theory concerning location, capitalization, and rent going back to Hotelling
(1938) and far back to von Thünen (1842). Cornes and Sandler’s omission
and last-page suggestion reflect economists’ general regard for land as
tangential rather than central to the theory of public goods.
In their second edition, Cornes and Sandler (1996, 367) did include
the analysis of Scotchmer (1994), in which the fee for local public goods is
the payment of a land tax. Cornes and Sandler state, "We view the land tax
instrument to be more problematic when individuals are heterogeneous"
because some obtain more utility from the public good than others (367).
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An individual could limit his land holding to reduce his land tax while still
consuming the same amount of public good.
Instead of recognizing the virtues of tapping geo-rent, they only
point to a possible imperfection, such as that somebody who enjoys a local
park will own a tiny lot nearby and pay a land tax lower than his share of
the cost. This, say Cornes and Sandler (367), is a "perverse incentive." But
such free riding is rampant with income and sales taxes, in which tax
payments have hardly a gossamer relation to any benefit. Tapping geo-rent
is being judged in isolation by the standard of perfect efficiency, rather than
in comparison to other means of taxing people to pay for collective goods.
This “perverse incentive” proposition is also made in an institutional
vacuum. In practice, as Hamilton (1975) points out, rules can mitigate the
problem. City lots tend to have a uniform size, either with zoning or with
covenants. Moreover, much of the utility of dwellers comes from
complementarities, from the lot and improvements (house and garden) as
well as from a set of civic services, so as analyzed by Ellickson (1971),
heterogeneous utilities are of little empirical significance.
Evidently Cornes and Sandler (1996) did not consider the Scotchmer
material to warrant entries for land or rent in their 2nd edition index. On the
last page (552) of the 2nd edition, the authors repeat their earlier suggestion
of research into the spatial dimension, and again assert that there exists no
general analysis of spatial clubs, this time much less justified. (Foldvary
(1994) did analyze spatial clubs in some generality!)
William Fischel (1998) puts a different twist on zoning, saying that
zoning provides a way to collect land rent by granting developers
exceptions in exchange for fees. But development impact fees distort
development by placing a charge on a particular activity rather than having
a uniform levy rate on all geo-rent. While it may seem efficient to let those
benefiting from a development pay for the related infrastructure, it in effect
has the opposite effect from that sought by Henry George: those who build
get taxed, while those who let their lands lie idle are not taxed. Moreover,
the impact fee may end up taxing capital and labor along with geo-rent.
Remarkably, Fischel (1998, 11) states that “property taxation cannot
achieve any significant efficiency at the state level.” This, he says, is because
states are too large for Tiebout effects, and states can internalize the
benefits of development. This ignores the efficiency gains of shifting away
from deadweight-loss-causing taxation, a gain that Fischel recognizes two
pages later (13). Fischel (1998, 15) also accuses site-value taxation of high
administrative costs in “the knife-edge goal” of “getting almost all land
rent.” This is a straw-man, since the real-world cases of geo-rent taxation

119

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1, APRIL 2005

FRED E. FOLDVARY

have not sought to measure and collect the full geo-rent exactly, and in fact
there are numerous cases of successful implementation (Andelson 2000).
Championing zoning, Fischel (1998, 16) states that “the zoning
system does not have to be all that accurate.” Yet for some reason, geo-rent
taxation must be “knife-edge” precise. As is well-known, zoning is a blunt,
highly politicized, and highly discretionary instrument. It often becomes
perverse. By comparison, governmental rules for assessing geo-rent would
be much simple, transparent, universal, and relatively free of politicking.
The Tiebout Model
The landmark model of competition among communities in the
provision of collective goods is that of Charles Tiebout (1956), which, as
Bruce Hamilton (1991, 672) stated, offered an "antidote to Samuelson's
rather gloomy results." Paul Samuelson (1954, 388) had stated categorically,
"no decentralized pricing system can serve to determine optimally these levels of collective
consumption" (italics in the original).
Tiebout’s analysis shows that this conclusion does not hold for local
civic goods. The consumers can select the communities which best satisfy
their preferences. In the Tiebout model, unlike the Buchanan club model,
the provision of the club goods is held fixed. Consumers reveal their
demands for collective goods through a choice of community, and
competition among communities assures that local collective goods are
provided at minimum cost. Residents dissatisfied with their community's
civic goods will leave, resulting in, at the limit, homogenous communities
with respect to the public goods desired by the residents. Joseph Stiglitz
(1983) points out that pure homogeneity is not necessary to the Tiebout
conclusions if there are productive interactions among people, if there are
transportation costs, and if people have different utility functions for land.
Though Tiebout in his model recognizes space with respect to
congestion, it is unfortunate that the model itself has no spatial dimensions
and no land rent. It was unfortunate both because it made the Tiebout
model incomplete and because much of the subsequent Tiebout literature
also ignores land. As stated by Hamilton (1991, 673), "the tax instrument is
of critical importance if the efficiency or even existence of a Tiebout
equilibrium is to be achieved." And as stated by Blankart and Borck (2004,
455), "Problems arise in the Tiebout model if public services are financed
by distortionary taxation."
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The value of a city park diminishes with the distance from the park.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, those closest to the park will have a higher georent. The most efficient way to finance the community is from the geo-rent,
not by equal dues payments. The Tiebout model will reflect the territorial
ambit of goods only when land and location are taken into account.
The spatial dimension has been recognized in the Henry George
Theorem and by analysts who have incorporated the capitalization of civic
goods into site value. The empirical studies of Wallace Oates (1969) found
evidence for the capitalization of the benefits of local collective goods and
of property taxes.
Buchanan and Goetz (1972) found that the internalization of what
otherwise would be externalities would occur if the communities are
proprietary and if competition equalizes the value of the externality. "Tax
shares would have to be related to the size of the locational rent component
in individual income receipts" (35; italics in the original). "If all valued
'space' should be privately owned and if competition among proprietary
ownership units were effective in all respects, allocational efficiency might
emerge" (40). Tyler Cowen (1988, 14) notes that models such as that of
Buchanan and Goetz "offer the intriguing suggestion that Tiebout's model
is better suited to analyses of collective goods provision through proprietary
communities."

HOW LARGE IS THE GEO-RENT TAX-BASE?
One of the pitfalls surrounding the idea of tapping geo-rent is that it
is closely associated with Henry George’s single-tax ideal society. Authors
such as Mankiw (2004, 168) and McConnell and Brue (2005, 300) point out
that geo-rent taxation alone could not cover the current levels of
government spending. But that point works only as a criticism of
eliminating all taxes aside from geo-rent taxation, not as a criticism of the
principle of tapping geo-rent.
I have the further impression that many economists think that georent is a tiny portion of GDP. That notion seems to lead some economists
to figure that even if geo-rent taxation is efficient, it is empirically of small
import. Dick Netzer (1998, 116) notes that the proposition that “the
potential revenue from land value taxation” is insufficient “is widely held
today.”
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In a chapter entitled “rent, interest, and profits,” Salvatore and Diulio
(1996) have an exercise, “What are the criticisms of the single-tax
movement?” One criticism offered is that “rents in the United States today
amount to just about 1% of GNP, while taxes are 25% of GNP” (355).
In the official GDP accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in
the Department of Commerce, the only category termed “rent” is "rental
income of persons," which in 2004 was put at an annualized estimate of
$150 billion, or less than 1.5% of GDP. This "rental income" is net of
expenses such as property taxes and mortgage interest, but the bulk of such
expenses are also returns on real estate which are being paid to lenders and
the government!
The BEA’s “rental income of persons” includes rental payments for
both the sites and the buildings, adjusted down for the deprecation or
“capital consumption” of the improvements. Without capital consumption,
the rental income is $166 billion, and that includes the imputed rentals of
owner-occupied houses and the mortgage interest paid. This “rental income
of persons” is personal income, excluding the rental income from land
owned by corporations as well as the implicit opportunity-cost rental value
of land held by governments and nonprofit agencies. Furthermore,
corporate-owned land is severely understated in corporate reports, because
land is valued at the historical purchase price, not current value.
That economists would believe that the GDP rental income figures
comes anywhere close to being the total land rent is quite remarkable.
Other official data come closer to the actual geo-rent. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the Department of Labor reported that consumer units spent
an average of $13,283 on housing in 2002, one third of total spending (BLS
2004), including the imputed rental of owner-occupied dwellings. The BLS
reports 112,108,000 "consumer units" (households), so the total spent for
housing was $1.5 trillion, ten times the "rental income" figure of the BEA.
That the $150 in BEA rental-income accounts have little connection with
actual geo-rent becomes even clearer when compared to the 2003 home
mortgage debt of $7.2 trillion (Financial Services Fact Book 2005), total
mortgages of $9.3 trillion in 2003 (Financial Services Fact Book 2005), and
a housing stock of $15 trillion (National Association of Realtors 2005).
Property taxes in the U.S. are about $300 billion per year (Youngman
and Malme 1993), with $228 billion going to local governments (Fisher
1999). If a landlord collects $20,000 in annual rent and pays a property tax
of $9,000, the “rental income of persons” here (not subtracting
depreciation) is only $11,000, because the reported amount deducts the
landlord’s property-tax expense. Similarly, homeowner and condominium
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association dues are deducted out in arriving at “rental income of persons.”
This category “rental income of persons,” then, both includes elements
other than geo-rent (notably, rental payments for improvements such as
buildings), and excludes much of the geo-rent of the land.
Moreover, as Gaffney (1970, 194) concludes, the untaxing of
buildings, which is part of the geo-rent taxation proposal, will raise ground
rent by an amount about equal to the loss of building taxes. Narrowing the
property tax to geo-rent only, therefore, would increase the geo-rent taxbase by about the same amount as the building tax-based removed.
Studies of geo-rent have been conducted by Steven Cord, Mason
Gaffney, Mike Miles, and others. Mason Gaffney (1970, 181) finds that site
value is generally at least half of real estate value, which would imply that
for the housing stock alone the site value would be about $7.5 trillion.
For private lands, much of the revenue from geo-rent is hidden in
interest payments, corporate profits, and capital gains, implying that it isn’t
showing up in “rental income of persons.” For example, the way that
building-owners may treat “depreciation” is unrealistic and even
nonsensical. Suppose Bob buys a building for $275,000 (excluding the land
value) and rents it out for $40,000 per year. On the premise that a building
is used up in 27.5 years, the tax code allows him to deduct $10,000 each
year. And then he deducts his real expense (maintenance, etc.) of, say,
$5,000, so the column shows only $25,000 in rental income. Suppose that
after 27.5 years, Bob sells the building to Sam. Now Sam starts deducting
depreciation all over again. Capital consumption is to a large degree a legal
fiction.
One bids less for land that has tax liabilities and on which profits are
lower. Untax the economy, and the economy would produce greater output,
which would be capitalized into higher geo-rent. Even if the geo-rent today
were accurately calculated, it would be far less than the potential public
revenue, because of capitalization effects of the untaxing side of the scheme.
As noted, the scheme would involve geo-rent payments from government
agencies. That, of course, will brings a corresponding increase in
government spending, so the matter of geo-rent of government lands is not
pertinent to the present issue. However, it is worth noting that for
government lands, the geo-rent is utterly opaque (Foldvary 1989), and that
would have to change.
Using a variety of data, Steven Cord (1985, 1991) puts geo-rent at
around 20 percent of GDP. Mike Miles (1990) comes up with a similar
figure using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The totals include
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government lands, but these estimates do not include the increase in georent that would occur with the elimination of market-hampering taxes.
The amount of actual and potential site revenues warrants much
more research, but these findings indicate that the tax base is substantial,
most likely in the range of 50 percent of all-level government tax revenues.
Interestingly, if both punitive taxes and transfer payments were eliminated,
the geo-rent would about equal government spending for goods and
services, in accord with the Henry George Theorem! At any rate, any
allegation that land rent is too small to be of policy significance would have
to be well argued.

OTHER ADVANTAGES OF TAPPING GEO-RENT
While this article will not necessarily serve as a manifesto for the idea
of tapping geo-rent to fund community goods, there are a number of
further advantages that merit passing mention.
• Geo-rent taxation would reduce sprawl. Current tax policies tend to
discourage the development of urban land, because the fruits of
those developments are directly taxed. To the extent that those
policies are replaced by policies that tap geo-rent, the landowner is
incented to develop his land. Recall, an underused site pays the same
geo-rent tax as a developed site. The untaxing of production
combined with the tapping of geo-rent will induce infilling of the city
center, making for a more compact city, agreeable to mixed use and
pedestrian activity. Hence, the demand-side push for sprawl is
diminished. Moreover, the supply-side pull toward sprawl would also
be diminished: Today, sprawl landowners are subsidized by
extraneous taxpayers who pay for the roads, sewers, schools, firefighting, and security in the sprawl neighborhoods. If those services
depended on the community’s geo-rent, the pull toward sprawl would
be reduced.
• Dampening cycles: Today, a factor in cycles is real-estate speculation.
An economic boom increases the price of land, and speculation can
drive prices even higher. Geo-rent taxation would mean that there are
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no “killings” to be made in land, since 75 percent of the geo-rent
would flow to the government, not the landowner. Tapping geo-rent
would dampen the real-estate cycle, which in turn dampens the
business cycle (Foldvary 1997).
• Tax-base of last resort: Technology promises to make capital and
people ever more mobile, and encryption promises to make money
and enterprise less visible. Put differently, technology threatens to
make conventional taxation more difficult. Tapping geo-rent may
well be the revenue source most suitable for the 21st century.
Technology will never enable the landowner to hide his land or move
it off-shore.

PRIVATIZING THE NEIGHBORHOOD
Fortunately, real-estate practitioners pay no attention to textbook
economics. Increasingly, new communities are developed within a nexus of
private ownership and contract. In the United States, four-fifths of new
housing developments involve membership in homeowner associations
(Community Associations Institute 2005). In China, all major new
developments have walls, guards and private governments (Webster 2002).
In Russia (Lentz and Lindner 2002) and South Africa (Jürgens and Gnad,
2002; Landman 2002), wealthier citizens privately provide for their safety in
gated communities. The empirical fact on the ground is attracting increasing
academic attention from many fields, including urban studies, legal scholars,
and anthropologists, and there have been international scholarly
conferences to explore private communities (Glasz 2005).
The great challenge concerns existing communities of the traditional
governmental structure: How are they converted to a nexus of private
property and contract?
Robert Nelson (1999) has proposed a policy for converting
neighborhoods to residential associations, similar to the policy in St. Louis,
where neighborhoods may privatize (Foldvary 1994). Under Nelson’s plan,
state law would permit property owners to petition to form a neighborhood
association within a proposed boundary. Approval would require an
affirmative vote both of 90 percent of the total property value affected and
75 percent of the individual unit owners. The relevant governments would
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then authorize a transfer of services and property such as streets to the
association, accompanied by tax credits in compensation for the reduction
of government expenses. All property owners in the privatized
neighborhood would be required to be members of the association and pay
assessments. Since they would already have title to the real estate, there is
no financial impediment, as there would be if they had to buy the land
afresh.
Conversion to civic associations would not only partially privatize
local governance, it would also result in a shift in public finances, with
lower taxes to the city, replaced by association assessments which would be
much closer to geo-rent. The association would get revenue from payments
either equal per member or based on front footage or property value. The
economic ideal would be payments based on geo-rent, because the rent
would most closely reflect the value of the community services. But even if
there is, say, an equal payment by the real estate owners, if the properties
have about the same market value, the payments would have the effect of
tapping geo-rent, with no excess burden.
My proposal (Foldvary 1994) for a neighborhood conversion makes
the membership in private communities strictly voluntary and open to any
real estate owner. Any person or organization having title to land would be
able to partially secede, to withdraw property and services from
governmental jurisdiction, and create its own governance. The government
could require an exit fee or on-going rental payments to compensate for its
services that the private community would still benefit from. If most of a
neighborhood wishes to privatize but some do not, those wishing to remain
directly under the government would continue to be under government
jurisdiction, and there would then be agreements for the joint provision of
services such as streets that service both members and non-members. While
this may result in a more complicated arrangement than that of Nelson, I
believe it is important to maintain the voluntary nature of civic associations
as much as possible.

CONCLUSION
The shunting aside and disparagement of public revenue from georent has distorted economic analysis and contributes to iatrogenic
economy-hampering fiscal policy. We need a broader and more integrated
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public economics that recognizes the fundamental role of land in
economies and fully incorporates the analysis of public revenue from georent. We will then not only have a more complete and accurate science of
economics, but also economists will then offer better remedies for
economic problems.
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